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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (k) (Supp. 1992) provides 
jurisdiction for this appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Is it reasonable to believe that the jury disregarded the 
expert testimony regarding the standards of care where the experts 
essentially agreed on the applicable standards and Dr. Gibb 
admitted breaching one or more of them? 
Standard of Review: Although the Court 
reviews jury instructions for correctness, it 
will reverse a judgment only where the claimed 
error was prejudicial. Rowley v. Graven 
Brothers & Co., Inc., 26 Utah 448, 491 P.2d 
1209 (1971). 
2. Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury 
on Mrs. Brady's res ipsa loquitur theory? 
Standard of Review: The Court reviews jury 
instructions for correctness. The Carpet Barn 
v. State Dept. of Transportation, 786 P.2d 775 
(Utah App. 1990) . 
3. Did the trial court have a reasonable basis to admit Dr. 
Cook's testimony? 
Standard of Review: The Court upholds the 
trial court's refusal to order a new trial if 
the trial court made its decision on any 
reasonable basis. Crookston v. Fire Insurance 
Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
4. Did Dr. Gibb waive his right to contest Dr. Cook's 
testimony? 
Standard of Review: The Court upholds a trial 
court's refusal to order a new trial if the 
party claiming surprise failed to object or 
move to strike the testimony at trial. 
Chournos v. D'Aqnillo, 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 
1982) . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case involves a claim for personal injuries to Mrs. 
Marjorie Brady when Mrs. Brady's uninvolved right eye was burned 
and damaged by a chemical solution used by Dr. Randal Gibb during 
surgery on her left cheek. 
B. Proceedings in the Court Below. 
Robert C. Brady and Marjorie A. Brady commenced this 
action seeking damages for personal injuries arising from an 
automobile accident. Defendant Utah Power & Light ("UP&L") 
admitted causing the accident, but filed a third party complaint 
and cross claim against other defendants seeking apportionment of 
fault and indemnity for the additional damages sustained by Mrs. 
Brady due to malpractice during the medical treatment of her 
injuries. The Bradys subsequently amended their complaint to 
assert claims against these parties. 
During the trial which began on September 22, 1992, 
plaintiff Robert C. Brady fully settled his claims and was 
dismissed from the action. Marjorie A. Brady also settled all of 
her claims for personal injury, except those relating to her right 
eye. This settlement fully settled all claims against UP&L by both 
plaintiffs, however, UP&L remained a party for the sole purpose of 
apportioning fault. The trial court granted the motion for 
directed verdict in behalf of Dr. Clisto D. Beaty and dismissed him 
from the action. 
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At the conclusion of the trial, the jury rendered its 
verdict against the remaining defendants and apportioned fault in 
the following percentages: UP&L - 0%; Mountain View Hospital -
10%; Dr. Randal B. Gibb - 3 0%; Xittrium Laboratories - 4 0%; Baxter 
Healthcare Corporation -- 20%. The jury also awarded $330,503.15 
in damages. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment on 
October 14, 1992. (R. 1471). Defendants filed motions for new 
trial, judgment NOV and remittitur which the trial court denied. 
(R. 1800). Later, Plaintiff Marjorie Brady settled her judgment 
against defendants Mountain View Hospital, Xittrium Laboratories 
and Baxter Healthcare Corporation. The remaining defendant, Dr. 
Randal B. Gibb, has pursued this appeal. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
The issues in this appeal relate to malpractice claims 
against Dr. Gibb. During surgery Mrs. Brady's uninvolved right eye 
was seriously and permanently injured when Dr. Gibb got a toxic, 
antimicrobial solution into Mrs. Brady's right eye. Dr. Gibb quite 
naturally recites selected facts in a manner highly favorable to 
his position. Appellee therefore provides additional facts. 
1. Mrs. Marjorie Brady, as a passenger in a car her 
husband was driving, was injured in an accident when a truck owned 
and operated by UP&L crossed center line from the opposite 
direction and struck their vehicle. Mrs. Brady was taken to 
Mountain View Hospital in Payson, Utah, to receive emergency 
treatment for a severe laceration and fracture of her left cheek. 
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Mrs. Brady sustained no injury to her right eye nor the right side 
of her face from the accident. (Ex. 11; T. 900-910). 
2. Dr. Randal Gibb, the emergency physician at Mountain 
View Hospital, determined that surgery was necessary. After Dr. 
Clisto Beaty, the anesthesiologist, administered general 
anesthesia, Dr. Gibb used an antimicrobial solution containing 
chlorhexidine gluconate (hereinafter "chlorhexidine") to cleanse 
the open wound on Mrs. Brady's left cheek. (T. 907-911). It is 
uncontested that chlorhexidine somehow entered Mrs. Brady's right 
eye and burned her cornea. (T. 900) . Dr. Gibb admits that he was 
the only person who used the chlorhexidine. (T. 901). 
3. Upon awakening from anesthesia, Mrs. Brady 
immediately complained of burning in her right eye. Thereafter, 
she lost the sight in her right eye. (T. 1063-1065) . Approximately 
four months later, Mrs. Brady had her first eye surgery which 
included a cornea transplant by Dr. Kevin Charlton. (T. 684) . It 
was conclusively determined thereafter that the damage to her eye 
was caused by the chlorhexidine. (T. 553-562). 
4. After the cornea transplant, Mrs. Brady's vision was 
mostly restored, however, it began to deteriorate until she again 
lost her vision, resulting in a second eye surgery in November, 
1990. (T. 689). Her vision was again partially restored, but as 
before, her vision deteriorated for a third time, necessitating a 
third eye surgery in September, 1992, approximately two weeks 
before trial. (T. 690). Though Dr. Charlton at trial was 
optimistic about her right eye vision, she remained at risk for 
further complications, including glaucoma, corneal graft rejection, 
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infection of some of the sutures that had been left in place, 
ulcers on the cornea, retinal detachment, and even total blindness. 
(R. 694-696). She is required to take antibiotics, steroid 
medications, and eye drops for the rest of her life. (R. 6 95-696) . 
The continual dryness, itching and pain in her right eye are 
permanent. (Id.). 
5. Mrs. Brady's direct focal vision was mostly restored 
after each of the surgeries, however, her peripheral vision 
remained impaired. Dr. Charlton described that the transplanted 
cornea only replaced approximately 7-l/2mm of the total 12mm 
diameter of the old damaged cornea. The outside 4-l/2mm of her old 
cornea remained in its burned, nontransparent condition. (T. 686) . 
Mrs. Brady testified that after each surgery her eyesight was 
improved and she could see fairly well straight ahead, but she 
still had a very difficult time with her peripheral vision. (T. 
1070-72; 1086-88). 
6. Mr. and Mrs. Brady initially filed a complaint 
against UP&L to recover for personal injuries from the auto 
accident. Thereafter, Mrs. Brady amended her complaint alleging 
malpractice claims against Dr. Gibb, Dr. Beaty and Mountain View 
Hospital and product liability claims against Baxter Healthcare 
Corporation (distributor of the chlorhexidine under the brand name 
of Exidine) and Xittrium Laboratories (manufacturer of Exidine). 
(R. 3 83) . During trial, Mr. Brady settled his claims against UP&L. 
Mrs. Brady also settled her claims against UP&L, but reserved her 
claims against the remaining defendants for the injuries to her 
right eye. (T. 979-984) . These remaining claims were submitted to 
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the jury, resulting in a verdict on October 1, 1992, wherein the 
jury apportioned fault as follows: UP&L - 0%; Mountain View 
Hospital - 10%; Dr. Randal B. Gibb - 3 0%; Xittrium Laboratories -
4 0%; Baxter Healthcare Corporation -- 2 0%. The jury awarded 
damages in the amount of $330,503.15. (R. 1445). 
7. Chlorhexidine was sold under the brand names of 
"Exidine - 4 Scrub Solution" and "Hibiclens". Both Exidine and 
Hibiclens have been used interchangeably by the medical profession 
including Dr. Gibb. (T. 587, 890-891). Exidine was the brandname 
of the chlorhexidine used by Dr. Gibb during Mrs. Brady's surgery. 
(T. 910) . 
8. Prior to the surgery, the manufacturer and 
distributor of Exidine provided the chlorhexidine in labeled 
containers which had the following print: "CAUTION: Keep Out of 
Eyes and Ears." (Bold in original.) The label then explained, "If 
Exidine - 4 scrub solution should get into eyes or ears, rinse out 
promptly and thoroughly with water." (Ex. 29). 
9. HIBICLENS, the brand name of the chlorhexidine most 
widely used by the medical profession, was manufactured by Stuart 
Pharmaceutical. (T. 587). In October, 1987, Stuart mailed over 
160,000 warning letters, referred to as "Dear Doctor" letters, to 
doctors registered with the American Medical Association and 
hospitals throughout the country. (T. 994-1005; 1016; 1021-1037). 
This warning letter directed the healthcare industry not to use 
chlorhexidine as a preoperative scrub around the eyes due to its 
toxic effect on eye tissue. It warned of serious and permanent eye 
injuries if directions were not followed. (Ex. 31 and 59) . Stuart 
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mailed one of these "Dear Doctor" letters directly to Dr. Gibb at 
his correct business address. (T. 999, 1237; Ex. 57 and 58). 
10. The Physicians Desk Reference, Ed. 1988 was 
distributed toward the end of 1987. (T. 739) . Experts who 
testified at the time of trial concurred that the Physicians Desk 
Reference ("PDR") is akin to the "Bible" for physicians. (T. 551, 
589-591). Dr. Gibb had subscribed to the PDR since he began his 
practice and used them as authoritative reference books. (T. 1235-
1236, 1238). The 1988 PDR contained the following warnings about 
chlorhexidine: 
HIBICLENS...(Chlorhexiden Gluconate) 
* * * 
WARNINGS: 
FOR EXTERNAL USE ONLY. KEEP OUT OF EYES AND 
EARS AND AVOID CONTACT WITH MENINGES. 
HIBICLENS SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A PREOPERATIVE 
SKIN PREP OF THE PREORBITAL OR EYELID AREAS. 
IF HIBICLENS SHOULD GET INTO EYES OR EARS, 
RINSE OUT PROMPTLY AND THOROUGHLY WITH WATER. 
Misuse of HIBICLENS has been reported to cause 
serious and permanent eye injury when it has 
been permitted to enter and remain in the eye 
during surgical procedures. Chlorhexidine has 
been reported to cause deafness when instilled 
in the middle ear through perforated eardrums 
(Ex. 30; Bold in original) 
11. Dr. Gibb described his use of the chlorhexidine 
during Mrs. Brady's surgery, which included applying "copious" 
amounts all around the left cheek, left eye, left forehead, and 
nose, including the right side of the bridge of her nose. (T. 910-
911; 924-925) . The specific time and manner in which the 
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chlorhexidine entered the right eye is unknown. (T. 629-630, 900-
901) . 
12. At trial, the parties called expert witnesses 
regarding the standard of care for Dr. Gibb. All experts, 
including Dr. Gibb, testified that the standard of care included 
the following duties under these circumstances: 
A. A prudent and reasonable doctor does not allow 
chemical solutions or other foreign substances to enter the eye 
unless it is specifically intended for treatment. (T. 558, 744-
745, 900, 939-940, 1212, 1215, 1279-1280, 1351). 
B. All directions that pertain to the use of a 
pharmaceutical solution should be strictly adhered to. (T. 602-
603, 651, 739, 742, 1227, 1268-1269, 1337-1338, 1349, 1357-1358). 
C. A prudent and reasonable physician should know 
the active ingredients as well as the general trade names of the 
pharmaceutical solutions used by the physician. (T. 651, 676-677, 
742, 1228, 1268-1269, 1337-1340, 1349, 1353-1358). 
D. A prudent and reasonable physician should stay 
abreast of the changing directions, warnings and other uses of 
pharmaceutical solutions used by the physician. (T. 548-556, 587-
591, 599, 606-610, 739-743, 1227-1228, 1268, 1337-1340, 1349, 1353-
1358). 
13, The parties collectively called four expert 
witnesses to address Dr. Gibb's standard of care and the breach 
thereof. In addition, both Dr. Gibb and Dr. Beaty gave some 
testimony regarding these issues. 
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A. Plaintiff called Dr. Frederick Fraunfelder who 
is presently the director of the Casey Eye Institute in Portland, 
Oregon. Casey Eye Institute is a worldwide clearing house and 
referral center for toxic eye injuries. It performs extensive 
research and treatment regarding the effects of drugs, chemicals 
and environment on the visual system, and is involved with over 
40,000 worldwide patients a year. Dr. Fraunfelder is one of the 
world's foremost experts in this area. (T. 546-551, 611-612). Dr. 
Fraunfelder testified that: 
(1) chlorhexidine should not be used as a 
preoperative skin scrub around the eyes, because of 
the serious risk of causing permanent eye injury 
(T. 554-535, 596); 
(2) that a reasonable doctor reading the 
label on the Exidine containers would know that the 
solution was not to be used as a preoperative scrub 
(T. 602-604); and 
(3) Dr. Gibb failed to follow the directions 
"Keep out of eyes" and that if he had followed this 
instruction, there would have been no eye injury to 
Mrs. Brady. (T. 668-669). 
Dr. Fraunfelder was prepared to give further testimony that Dr. 
Gibb misused the chlorhexidine in violation of the label instruc-
tions when Dr. Gibb used it as a preoperative scrub. However, the 
court sustained an objection from Dr. Gibb's counsel who claimed 
that such testimony was unfair surprise. The court only allowed 
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Dr. Fraunfelder to testify generally about physicians without 
specific reference to Dr. Gibb.1 (T. 564-582, 599). 
B. Plaintiff also called Dr. Mark Granick, a 
Harvard Medical School graduate, board certified in both 
Otolaryngology and Plastic Surgery. (T. 718-720). Dr. Granick 
teaches at two different medical schools in Pennsylvania. (T. 
721) . He confirmed that it was common knowledge among doctors that 
Hibiclens and Exidine were essentially the same product that 
contained chlorhexidine. (T. 739). The 1988 PDR, distributed by 
the end of 1987, warned that chlorhexidine should not be used on 
the face (T. 73 9-740), and that such warning was widely known in 
the medical community on a local, regional and national basis. (T. 
741). He acknowledged receipt of the "Dear Doctor" letter but had 
already stopped using it on the face before that time. (T. 741-
742) . Dr. Granick testified that Dr. Gibb had breached his 
standard of care by: (1) failing to review the literature and other 
professional publications indicating the hazards of chlorhexidine 
(T. 743) ; (2) using chlorhexidine on the face which created the 
hazard to Mrs. Brady's eye (T. 743-744) ; and (3) allowing it to get 
into Mrs. Brady's eye. (T. 744-745). 
xIt is Mrs. Brady's position that the court erred in sustain-
ing Dr. Gibb's objection and that Dr. Fraunfelder should have been 
permitted to testify that Dr. Gibb misused the product. The issue 
of whether Dr. Gibb should have used the chlorhexidine as a 
preoperative scrub was a central issue in the case and had been the 
subject of extensive discovery. From the beginning, defendants 
Xittrium and Baxter had claimed that Dr. Gibb had misused the 
product in this way. This error, however, favored Dr. Gibb, who is 
claiming the trial was unfair. 
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C. Counsel for Xittrium, Baxter and Mountain View 
Hospital called Dr. Randal J. Olsen, Chairman of the Department of 
Ophthalmology at the University of Utah Medical Center and board 
certified in ophthalmology. (T. 1306). Dr. Olsen testified that 
since the eye is an "unforgiving test chamber" only the safest 
products should be used around the eye. Because of its potential 
toxicity, the ophthalmology group at the U of U Medical Center 
never used chlorhexidine. (T. 1330-1331). If a doctor must use 
any product which is not known to be completely safe to the eye, 
the doctor should use it minimally and exercise extreme caution. 
(T. 1331) . He was critical of Dr. Gibb for using "copious" amounts 
around Mrs. Brady's eyes. (T. 1332). Dr. Olsen also verified that 
at the time of Mrs. Brady's surgery, the toxic effect of 
chlorhexidine was well known in the medical community. (T. 1336). 
In fact, he had seen at least two cases in Salt Lake City where 
chlorhexidine had caused eye injuries, which was widely known and 
discussed as early as 1986. (T. 1353-1354). He also recalls 
published articles, discussions in professional settings and the 
"Dear Doctor" letter that was widely disseminated. (T. 1336, 1353-
1354, 134 0). He confirmed that regardless of how well known the 
toxicity of chlorhexidine was, the label on the container contain-
ing the words "CAUTION: Keep Out of Eyes" was sufficient to warn 
any doctor of the potential for eye injury. (T. 1342). Finally, 
Dr. Olsen testified that a reasonable and prudent doctor would not 
allow this solution to get into an uninvolved eye during surgery. 
(T. 1351) . 
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D. Defendant Dr. Clisto Beaty (the 
anesthesiologist) testified that it was a generally accepted 
principle during surgery that the surgeon should keep all foreign 
substances out of an uninvolved eye and that all doctors would know 
this. (T. 939-940). 
E. Dr. Randal Gibb called Dr. G. Marshton Blanch 
as his expert. Dr. Blanch is a board certified ENT who practices 
in Sandy, Utah. Though Dr. Blanch refused to find any fault with 
Dr. Gibb, he admitted that a reasonable and prudent physician using 
a product on the face should know the active ingredients of the 
product, including the warnings. (T. 1268). He also admitted that 
if a product contains a label "CAUTION: Keep out of the Eyes" that 
the direction should be strictly adhered to. (T. 1269) . He also 
admitted that Dr. Gibb had violated the instructions contained on 
the Exidine label and also the warnings and directions contained in 
the 1988 PDR. (T. 1277) . To avoid placing fault on Dr. Gibb, 
however, Dr. Blanch testified that a reasonable physician is under 
no duty to read the labels nor consult the PDR. (T. 1265-1266). 
Dr. Blanch admitted he had never used chlorhexidine as a preopera-
tive scrub. (T. 1264). 
F. Dr. Gibb in his own testimony confirmed that 
at the time of Mrs. Brady's surgery, he considered Exidine and 
Hibiclens to be the same product and used them interchangeably. 
(T. 890-891). Dr. Gibb admitted: 
(1) not knowing the active ingredient (chlor-
hexidine) in Exidine or Hibiclens even though he 
admitted that a reasonable and prudent doctor 
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should be aware of the active ingredients (T. 897, 
1230-1234); 
(2) never reading the directions on the 
Exidine label even though he admitted a reasonable 
and prudent doctor should read the labels of the 
products he or she uses (T. 892, 898, 1214); 
(3) never having looked at the PDR regarding 
this product even though he had received and 
consulted the PDR since he began practicing medi-
cine (T. 898, 1235-1236); 
(4) the Exidine got into Mrs. Brady's right 
eye and that he was the only one using the Exidine, 
though he does not know how it got into her eye (T. 
900-901); 
(5) all unintended foreign solutions should 
be kept out of the eyes, because of the potential 
for injury (T. 900, 1215); 
(6) the address with his name on the "Dear 
Doctor" mailing list was correct, though he did not 
remember receiving the letter (T. 1237) ; 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Jury Instructions. 
The expert testimony presented by both Mrs. Brady and the 
defendants was not divergent and unequivocally established the 
appropriate standard of care and breach thereof. Consequently, 
there is no reasonable basis to believe the jury disregarded all of 
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the expert testimony in favor of a different standard. Moreover, 
the trial court's only error in instructing the jury was its 
refusal to give Mrs. Brady's res ipsa loquitur instruction. Had 
this error not occurred, there is no reason to believe that the 
resulting verdict would have favored Dr. Gibb. 
B. Dr. Cook's Testimony. 
Because the trial court had reasonable bases to conclude 
that (a) Dr. Cook's testimony rebutted Dr. Olsen's testimony and 
(b) Dr. Cook was qualified to render expert testimony, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order a new 
trial. This court should affirm the trial court in any event on 
the basis that Dr. Gibb failed to preserve this claimed error and 
thus waived his right of review. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A REVIEWING COURT REVERSES A JUDGMENT ONLY 
WHEN THE APPELLANT DEMONSTRATES PREJUDICE. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Co. , Inc. , 2 6 
Utah 448, 491 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1971) noted: 
The mandate of our law is that we do not 
reverse for mere error or irregularity. We do 
so only if the complaining party has been 
deprived of a fair trial. The test to be 
applied is: Was there error or irregularity 
such that there is a reasonable likelihood to 
believe that in its absence there would have 
been a result more favorable to him? If upon 
a survey of the whole evidence this question 
must be answered in the negative, then there 
is no justifiable basis for reversal of a 
j udgment. 
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Dr. Gibb cannot prevail on this appeal, because he cannot demon-
strate that there is a reasonable likelihood that the result would 
have been any different absent the trial court's alleged errors. 
At trial, the experts generally agreed on the applicable 
standard of care. Hence, there is no reason to believe that the 
jury adopted a different standard as Dr. Gibb suggests. Further-
more, Mrs. Brady relied on a res ipsa loquitur theory which the 
trial court refused to present to the jury. If the trial court 
erred in instructing the jury, the error was its failure to give 
the res ipsa loquitur instruction. This error did not prejudice 
Dr. Gibb. 
II. THE CONSENSUS EXPERT TESTIMONY FROM ALL 
PARTIES, INCLUDING DR. GIBB, REGARDING THE 
STANDARD OF CARE AND THE BREACH THEREOF, 
SUPPORT THE VERDICT. 
A. All the Parties7 Experts Generally Agreed Upon the Applicable 
Standard of Care. 
The experts who testified at trial on the standard of 
care were: for plaintiff -- Dr. Fraunfelder and Dr. Granick; for 
defendant Gibb -- Dr. Blanch and Dr. Gibb; for defendants Xittrium, 
Baxter and Mountain View Hospital -- Dr. Olsen. The expert 
testimony, including Dr. Gibb, generally agreed that the applicable 
standards and duties were: 
1. A prudent and reasonable doctor does not allow 
chemical solutions or other foreign substances to enter the eye 
unless it is specifically intended for treatment. (T. 558 
(Fraunfelder) , 744-745 (Granick), 900, 1212, 1215 (Gibb), 1279-1280 
(Blanch), 1351 (Olsen)). 
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2. All directions that pertain to the use of a 
pharmaceutical solution should be strictly adhered to. (T. 602-
603, 651 (Fraunfelder) , 739, 742 (Granick) , 1227 (Gibb), 1268-1269 
(Blanch), 1337-1338, 1349, 1357-1358 (Olsen)). 
3. A prudent and reasonable physician should know the 
active ingredients as well as the general trade names of the 
pharmaceutical solutions used by the physician. (T. 651, 676-677 
(Fraunfelder), 742 (Granick), 1228 (Gibb), 1268-1269 (Blanch), 
1337-1340, 1349, 1353-1358 (Olsen)). 
4. A prudent and reasonable physician should stay 
abreast of the changing directions, warnings and other uses of 
pharmaceutical solutions used by the physician. (T. 548-556, 587-
591, 599, 606-610 (Fraunfelder), 739-743 (Granick), 1227-1228 
(Gibb), 1268 (Blanch), 1337-1340, 1349, 1353-1358 (Olsen)). 
B. The Expert Evidence Including Dr. Gibb's, Is Overwhelming that 
Dr. Gibb Breached the Applicable Standard of Care. 
The three medical experts (Fraunfelder, Granick and 
Olsen) called by plaintiff and defendants Mountain View, Xittrium 
and Baxter, forcefully demonstrate Dr. Gibb's breaches of all of 
the above standards. (See statement of facts, paragraph 12 and 
subparagraphs for more detail). In addition to the strong 
testimony from these renowned doctors, the admissions elicited from 
Dr. Gibb and his own expert, Dr. Blanch, substantiated the jury's 
verdict. Though not exhaustive, the following are examples. 
Dr. Gibb claimed innocence from culpability based upon 
ignorance of the toxicity of chlorhexidine. Yet, he testified as 
follows: 
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Q. . . . You heard Dr. Fraunfelder's testi-
mony that reasonable and prudent physi-
cians read the labels on the bottles of 
the products that they use, didn't you? 
A. Yea. 
Q. Do you agree with that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you agree with Dr. Fraunfelder's 
testimony that reasonable and prudent 
physicians are aware of the active ingre-
dient of the products they use? 
A. And generally should be, yes. 
(T. 1227-1228). 
Dr. Gibb, however, testified earlier in the trial: 
Q. Did you ever read the directions or 
labels on the container that had the 
Exidine? 
A. I don't think I did. Not prior to this 
incident. 
(T. 892) 
. . . Until this case, if you had asked me, "What 
is the active ingredient in Hibiclens," I would 
have said, "I don't know," because I don't keep the 
chemical names in my mind like I do the brand name 
on those kind of solutions. 
(T. 894). 
When I was told that the hospital was 
switching from Hibiclens to Exidine and 
I asked, "Is that the same as Hibiclens," 
and they said, "Yes," I made the connec-
tion that way; that Hibiclens and Exidine 
were connected -- were similar or the 
same solution. I did not know the name 
of the chemical -- active chemical 
ingredient of Hibiclens. At least it 
didn't register in my mind at that time. 
So I don't know what kind of connection 
I would have made if someone had talked 
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to me about chlorhexidine versus 
Hibiclens or Exidine. 
(T. 897). 
Regarding the duty to review current literature for 
products used by the doctor, Dr. Gibb admitted: 
Q. . . . [D]id you ever look in the 
Physician's Desk Reference, the PDR, to 
determine in 1988 whether there was a 
change in the use of Hibiclens? 
A. No. 
(T. 898). 
* * * 
A. . . . If I'd received that ["Dear 
Doctor"] letter, I certainly would have 
made the decision to stop using Hibiclens 
as a prep around the face. 
Q. And if you had made the effort to read 
the labels on Exidine to find that it had 
the same active ingredient, would the 
same be true with Exidine? 
A. Yes, I believe so. 
(T. 896) . The evidence was unrefuted that the "Dear Doctor" letter 
was mailed to Dr. Gibb at the correct address, postage prepaid. 
The law presumes that mail which is properly addressed and stamped 
arrives at its destination. See, for example, Thiessens v. Dept. 
of Employment Security, 663 P. 2d 72 (Utah 1983) . No further expert 
testimony was needed on this point for the jury to find that Dr. 
Gibb received the "Dear Doctor" letter, which would constitute a 
breach based on his own testimony. 
Regarding the issue that a doctor should not allow any 
unintended, foreign substance into a patient's eye during surgery, 
Dr. Gibb testified: 
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(900-901) 
Alright. Now, is it your practice to 
keep any substance out of someone's eye 
when doing surgery, except for that which 
you're purposely putting in the eye? 
Absolutely. 
Now, I think all the parties, including 
you, have agreed that it was Exidine that 
got into Mrs. Brady's right eye? 
We have. 
Did you get it in? 
I guess in an ultimate sense of responsi-
bility, I would have to answer "Yes" to 
that. I can't explain how or why that 
happened any more than the conjecture 
that you've heard here in the court, but 
I am the one that applied the Exidine to 
her face. Nobody else did. And I'm the 
one that selected, ultimately, that 
solution to be put in her eye. So the 
answer has to be, "Yes." 
[I]t was your practice at that 
time, and you still believe it to be 
true, that a reasonable doctor would take 
measures -- proper measures to keep solu-
tions, chemical solutions, out of the 
eye? 
Yes. 
And you would also agree that if proper 
precautions are taken by a doctor, a 
surgeon, that chemical solutions are not 
to get in the eye, are they? 
I agree that they are not to get in the 
eye. 
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Q. But you do admit that if proper care was 
taken, that substance should not get into 
the right eye under these circumstances? 
A. I admit that if proper care is taken, it 
should not get in there. 
(T. 1239-1240). 
Dr. Gibb's expert, Dr. Blanch, gave further evidence to 
support the jury's finding of fault. He admitted that a surgeon 
should know the warnings and instructions associated with the 
product he or she may use and should know the active ingredient of 
that product. As shown above, Dr. Gibb did not meet either of 
these two duties. Dr. Blanch also testified: 
Q. . . . [Biased on what you've read in the 
1988 PDR -- I'm limiting it to that only 
did he [Dr. Gibb] violate that 
instruction and that warning? 
A. He did violate the instruction, as it's 
reported in this PDR. 
* * * 
Q. . . . [W]ould that also be in violation 
of those express warnings and directions 






Isn't a prudent doctor -- or isn't a 
reasonable doctor very well aware that 
you don't get chemicals into the eyes, 
particularly those chemicals that you 
don't know the toxicity of? 
Yes. 
And unless -- on an uninvolved eye, 
wouldn't you agree that a prudent doctor 
would take necessary precautions to avoid 
getting any kind of chemical in an unin-
volved eye? 
A. Any chemical that he believed is toxic. 
Q. And if he didn't know, would he keep it 
out? 
A. If he didn't know whether it was toxic or 
not, he probably would try and keep it 
out. 
(T. 1279-1280). 
Q. . . . Dr. Blanch, if a solution you are 
using or any competent surgeon is using, 
states, "Caution, keep out of eyes," what 
does that mean to you? 
A. It would mean that I would try my best to 
keep it out of the eyes. 
Q. And if you got it in the eyes, whose 
fault would it be? 
A. It depends on who put it in the eyes. 
But if I did, it would be my fault. 
(T. 1286-1287, emphasis added). 
In light of the testimony of Dr. Gibb and his expert Dr. 
Blanch, the jury's finding was appropriate. When added to the 
testimony of the other experts, the evidence was overwhelming that 
Dr. Gibb shared in the responsibility for Mrs. Brady's eye 
injuries. If the jury had not found Dr. Gibb at fault, it would 
have been the basis for granting a new trial in favor of Mrs. 
Brady! 
Dr. Gibb cannot demonstrate that the alleged error in 
jury instructions, if corrected, would have resulted in a 
different outcome. For the error to be prejudicial, this Court 
would have to conclude that the jury likely disbelieved and 
disregarded all the expert testimony, and then found against Dr. 
Gibb based upon some notion of negligence unrelated to the expert 
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testimony. In light of the overwhelming expert testimony support-
ing the verdict, this conclusion is absurd. Thus, if giving both 
instructions was error, it was harmless at best. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT 
THE RES IPSA LOQUITUR INSTRUCTION TO THE 
JURY.2 
This case was ideally suited for application of the res 
ipsa loquitur doctrine. As stated by this Court in Rovlance v. 
Rowe, 737 P.2d 232, 234-235 (Utah App. 1987): 
Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine 
aiding in the proof of negligence. Anderton 
v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 834 (Utah 1980) . 
The purpose of res ipsa loquitur is 
to permit one who suffers injury from 
something under the control of another, 
which ordinarily would not cause injury 
except for the other's negligence, to 
present his grievance to a court or jury 
on the basis that an inference of negli-
gence may reasonably be drawn from such 
facts; and cast the burden upon the other 
to make proof of what happened. 
Id. at 833 (emphasis added) (citing Lund v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 Utah 2d 276, 351 
P.2d 952 (I960)); see also Joseph v. W.H. 
Groves Latter-Day Saint Hosp., 10 Utah 2d 94, 
348 P.2d 935 (1960); White v. Pinnev, 99 Utah 
484, 108 P.2d 249 (1940) . A res ipsa loquitur 
instruction is appropriate where a plaintiff 
is unable to pinpoint which act or omission on 
the part of a defendant breached a legally 
imposed standard of care. 
2Inasmuch as the jury returned a verdict favorable to Mrs. 
Brady, she did not file a cross-appeal in accordance with Halladay 
v. Cluff, 739 P.2d 643 (Utah App. 1987). However, it is well-
established that a prevailing party may argue trial court errors in 
support of the judgment even though the party has not cross-
appealed. Fuller v. Favorite Theaters Co. of Salt Lake, 119 Utah 
570, 230 P.2d 335, 336 (1951) and United States v. American Rv. 
Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435, 44 S.Ct. 560, 564, 68 L.Ed. 1087 
(1924) . 
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The Utah Supreme Court has particularly noted the applicability of 
res ipsa loquitur to cases, such as this, where the defendant 
health care provider has injured a healthy part of the plaintiff's 
body which was not the subject of the treatment. For example, see 
Malmstrom v. Olsen, 16 Utah 2d 316, 400 P.2d 209 (1965)--plaintiff 
suffered injury to previously pain free neck while undergoing 
treatment for low back pain; Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical 
Center, 791 P.2d 193 (Utah 1990)--plaintiff' s leg burned during 
delivery of her child; and Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 83 0 
P.2d 270 (Utah 1992)--plaintiff's teeth broken during knee surgery. 
This Court in Roylance v. Rowe, 737 P.2d 232, 235 (Utah 
App. 1987) listed the elements that a party must demonstrate before 
res ipsa loquitur applies: 
Before being entitled to such a jury instruc-
tion, however, a plaintiff must show: 
(1) [T] hat the accident was of a kind 
which, in the ordinary course of 
events, would not have happened had 
due care been observed; 
(2) that the plaintiff's own use or 
operation of the agency or instru-
mentality was not primarily respon-
sible for the injury; and 
(3) that the agency or instrumentality 
causing the injury was under the 
exclusive management or control of 
the defendant. 
Kusv v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 
1232, 1235 (Utah 1984) (citing Anderton, 607 
P.2d at 833). 
Mrs. Brady submitted a proposed res ipsa loquitur instruction to 
the trial court listing these very elements (Appendix A ) . 
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There was no factual issue at trial regarding the second 
or third elements of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. It was 
undisputed that Mrs. Brady was unconscious during the surgery and 
was not in any respect responsible for the injury to her right eye. 
Furthermore, Dr. Gibb readily admitted that he was in control of 
the scrubbing operation. The only remaining element was establish-
ing that the "accident was of a kind which, in the ordinary course 
of events, would not have happened had due care been observed." 
In Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that in many instances the first element had 
to be established by expert testimony. However, the court noted a 
significant exception: 
However, in certain situations, the medical 
procedure is so common or the outcome so 
affronts our notions of medical propriety that 
expert testimony is not required to establish 
what would occur in the ordinary course of 
events. In this type of situation the plain-
tiff can rely on the common knowledge and 
understanding of laymen to establish this 
element. 
Nixdorf, 612 P. 2d at 353. This case, involving injury to a healthy 
eye not involved in the treatment, called for the application of 
the exception. Accordingly, Mrs. Brady proposed instruction 20 
informing the jury that it could rely on its common knowledge and 
experience. 
After the parties had presented their evidence, defen-
dants Gibb and Beaty moved for a directed verdict on Mrs. Brady's 
res ipsa loquitur theory, which the trial court granted. (T. 1164-
1165) . Consequently, the trial court refused to give Mrs. Brady's 
res ipsa loquitur instruction but did give corollary instruction 
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20, engendering Dr. Gibb's contention on this appeal. Contrary to 
Dr. Gibb's arguments, the trial court erred not in giving instruc-
tion 20 but in refusing to give the res ipsa loquitur instruction. 
The record demonstrates that the trial court relied on 
Roylance, in holding that the res ipsa loquitur did not apply to 
Mrs. Brady's case. (T. 1165). In Roylance, this Court had 
observed that res ipsa loquitur did not apply "where the evidence 
in the case reveals all of the facts and circumstances of the 
occurrence and clearly establishes the precise allegedly negligent 
act which is the cause of plaintiff's injury." Roylance, 737 P.2d 
at 235. This Court was careful to note, however, that: 
This does not mean that introduction of evi-
dence of specific acts of negligence deprives 
a plaintiff of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur. This jurisdiction has long held 
that a case presented to the jury on specific 
theories of negligence does not preclude an 
instruction on a theory of res ipsa loquitur. 
Angerman Co. v. Edgemon, 76 Utah 394, 400, 290 
P. 169, 172 (1930) . Rather, the rule may be 
summarized as follows: Where the three condi-
tions for application of res ipsa loquitur 
have been established, a mere prima facie 
showing of specific negligence does not 
prevent its use. Under such circumstances the 
case should be submitted on both the theory of 
specific negligence and res ipsa loquitur. 
Thus, if proof bv a plaintiff of specific acts 
of negligence on the defendant's part does not 
furnish a complete explanation of the acci-
dent, as where there are alternative theories 
of negligence, there is still room for an 
inference of negligence arising from the 
happening of the accident. Where, however, 
proof of specific negligence goes so far as to 
reveal all the facts and circumstances and 
fully explain the alleged negligent cause of 
injury by positive evidence, res ipsa loquitur 
has no function. Kusy, 681 P. 2d at 1236. 
[Emphasis added.] 
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Roylance, 737 P.2d at 235. In considering the defendants' motion 
for directed verdict, the trial court stated: 
Where all of it is -- and there are specific 
allegations and facts, specific negligence, we 
have all the facts and circumstances surround-
ing what occurred, we know that the stuff got 
in there -- exactly how, we donft know, but we 
do have opinions it was negligently because of 
its use and in the application in the area 
where it was, that constituted negligence. 
[Emphasis added.] 
(T. 1165). The judge's comments demonstrate that he failed to 
understand Roylance. 
Judge Bunnell was under the impression that as long as 
the parties had agreed that Exidine was the agent which caused the 
injury, Mrs. Brady could not rely on res ipsa loquitur even though 
none of the parties could explain how the Exidine entered Mrs. 
Brady's right eye. However, the judge did not realize that res 
ipsa loquitur applies until all circumstances are known as is amply 
demonstrated by Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P. 2d 1232 
(Utah 1984) , the case upon which this Court relied in Roylance. 
In Kusv, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the rule that res 
ipsa loquitur could be used "unless the proof goes so far as to 
fully explain the cause of the injury by positive evidence 
revealing all of the facts and circumstances." Kusv, 681 P.2d at 
1236, quoting Ballhorst v. Hahner-Foreman-Cale, Inc., 207 Kan. 89, 
99, 484 P.2d 38, 46 (1971). Further illustrating the concept that 
all circumstances must be known before res ipsa loquitur is not 
available, the supreme court cited Kitto v. Gilbert, 570 P.2d 544 
(Colo. App. 1977), a medical malpractice action, and stated: 
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[I]t was clear that plaintiff's injury result-
ed from inadequate anesthetization when tubing 
connecting him to the anesthesiology apparatus 
became dislodged, but :1 t was unclear what 
caused the tubing to be dislodged. On those 
facts, it was held error to refuse a res ipsa 
instruction. 
Kusyf 6 81 p. 2d at 123 6 . Si n t:i 3 ai ] y here, :i t was ei ror f oi Ji icige 
Bunnell to refuse to give the res ipsa loquitur instruction in view 
of the judge's own statements regarding the status of the evidence. 
J i 1 £ * • - . < • . . - : , , , j 
injury was i :it disconnecting \ne anesthesiology apparatus, the 
parties here agreed that the c^^l^e *^: —• --•>>. . ry was Exidine. 
H o v • '^ • : ) 
give the res ip^a .oquji. -. jiioi.rui-t.ic-i: uecause -;r.e Knew how the 
tubing became disconnecter • T • " . \ ^ error +or Judge 
B u .. . . . • • • . . ' . ) 
the jury here where no one knew exactly how the Exidine managed to 
travel from the scrub area, to Mrs iy's healthy naht eyr 
If as Di: , G:i bb coi it ends, 3 J^^Y" ignores :.: -e experts' 
testimony (a doubtful proposition at best), the jury determined 
negligence • uhe basis of its own experience that injury to an 
uni :v-.|./v: • •- »lthy right eye does not occur in the absence of 
negligence. This of course, is a legitimate inference to make 
under a res ipsa loquitur theory, and. Dr. Gibb was not unfairly 
prejudiced thereby. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO ORDER A NEW TRIAL. 
A. This Court Reverses a Trial Court's Ruling on a Motion for New 
Trial Only When There Is No Reasonable Basis for the Trial Court's 
Decision. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated the standard of review 
applicable to a trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial in 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah 
1991): 
In reviewing the judge's ultimate decision to 
grant or deny a new trial, we will reverse 
only if there is no reasonable basis for the 
decision. 
Cases subsequently emphasizing the standard include State v. 
Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 224 (Utah 1992) and Andreason v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co., 848 P.2d 171, 174 (Utah App. 1993). Hence, 
this Court must affirm the trial court's refusal to order a new 
trial unless this Court determines that Judge Bunnell had no 
reasonable basis to deny a new trial. 
B. Judge Bunnell's Properly Determined that Dr. Cook Was a 
Rebuttal Witness. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that a trial 
court has "considerable latitude in admitting or excluding 
[rebuttal] evidence." Duncan v. Western Refrigeration Co. , 11 Utah 
2d 19, 354 P.2d 572, 573 (1960). As noted in Dr. Gibb's brief: 
Rebuttal evidence is that which tends to 
refute, or to so modify or explain, as to 
nullify or minimize the effect of the 
opponent's evidence. 
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Board of Education of South Sanpete, etc. v. Barton, 617 P.2d 347, 
3
 4 9 (ut ah 19 8 0) . Here, Dr. Cook' s I: e s 1 : i mc u ly d d i e c 11 y re f i 11: e c:i 1 1 l a 1; 
given by Dr 01sen and, hence, was rebuttal testimony. 
In her case in chief, Mrs, Brady discussed and demon-
strate d t o t h e j I I i: y t h c ] o s s :::»f h e i p e r i p 1 i e i a ] l: ? :; °"* • *1» i A <=> ^  ri ^  i b :l i I g 
such, difficulties as having to turn her head completely down before 
being able to see the ground and being fearful of falling while 
descendi ng stairs The fact that Dr Char ] t .• .diess 
peripheral vision one way or the other did not preclude Mrs. Brady 
from testifying about the loss. Hence, Mrs. Brady established in 
h *. • -ic • >ai i merits . 
D- J.'. asserts t:idi -. - t: J-: uould not introduce 
evidence 4 ;* ••: <•;- • • s ^ n ( s testimony si^.^ Mrs. Brady introduced 
pi . ' ; •' >r , - • . ::i: oss-examination. 
Significantly, as .: •••:.! acknowledges, Mrs. Brady did not 
introduce Dr. Olsen's conclusion that Mrs. Brady would have no 
visuaJ pnobl h'.it hrr , > 'o-tieLendanl Xi.tt.rd urn's counsel intro-
duced that evidence, Since Dr, Olsen's testimony contradicted the 
evidence introduced in, Mrs, Brady's case in chief, she was entit] ed 
to presei it fi irther e v idei ice to i ebut Dr. 01 sen1" s opinion. Even :i f 
Mrs. Brady had called Dr. 01sen, the Utah Rules of Evidence 
unambiguously permit a party who has called a witness LU I 
the w:i tries s shoul HI Llie witness introduce adverse t e s t i m o n y . See 
Rule 607, Utah Rules of Evidence. Dr. Olsen's deposition was taken 
September 14, I'VKl, 'Drily nine uays jjeia?< ) , Even 
though Mrs. Brady may have bee^ aw=ir° r *:. t. —-:/s opinion 
was, she had no need to introduce expert testimony regarding her 
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peripheral vision until her own testimony had been challenged by an 
expert. Thereafter, she was entitled to present her own expert on 
this issue. While allowing Dr. Cook to testify may have presented 
Judge Bunnell with a close call, he had a reasonable basis for 
admitting the testimony and therefore, his decision not to order a 
new trial was not an abuse of discretion. 
C. Judge Bunnell Properly Determined that Dr. Cook Had the 
Requisite Qualifications to Render an Opinion. 
The trial judge enjoys broad discretion in determining 
whether a witness is qualified to give expert testimony: 
It is largely within the discretion of the 
trial judge to pass on the qualifications of 
a witness as to whether he can give sound and 
reliable help to the jury with regard to 
subjects within his expertise. The knowledge 
of such a witness may have been acquired 
through formal education and study, but may 
also have been acquired through experience. 
Maltbv v. Cox Construction Co., Inc., 598 P.2d 336, 340 (Utah 
1979). The prime consideration is whether the proposed testimony 
can aid the finder of fact: 
Sherron contends that a comparison of Lyman's 
credentials with Dr. Halverson's clearly 
demonstrates Lyman's lack of qualification as 
an expert in the field of child abuse matters. 
Under Utah Rules of Evidence 702, the critical 
factor is whether the expert can assist the 
trier of fact, and, as a result, the trial 
court has discretion to qualify the proposed 
expert. 
State in Interest of L.D.S. v. Stevens, 797 P.2d 1133, 1138 (Utah 
App. 1990) . 
The trial court here properly determined that Dr. Cook 
had the appropriate qualifications to aid the jury in understanding 
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a subject not within their common experience. Near the beginning 
of Dr. Cook' s testimony, defendants' ecu iiise] objected tc » D:it : Cook' s 
qualifi cations to render an opinion concerning Mrs. Brady's impair-
ment. Judge Bunnell initially sustained the objection; 
I think I'd have to sustain the objection, 
unless you can qualify what his experience has 
been and how many cases he has examined, how 
many corneas -- that sort of thing in order to 
get a basis for an opinion of that kind. 
(T ! ^8? \ -.11 ,- . - , . . , -= • . . owing 
information regarding i • • ,oo*. * s experience. ; : ".onjunct LO-, with 
their treating physicians commonly rendered post-
operative : Mrs Brady's 
condition wah similar ! 4 those ne observed i.s post-operative 
patients, Dr. Cook routinely determined the visual acuity . ^se 
pat njntu JIKJ repoiled Ins letiuJl^ in oplit tialmologists, Surgeons 
with whom Dr. Cook worked relied upon ^ ok ; findings *s *r. 
visual impairment. Dr. Cook reguiarxy aeL( 
per i phera] ,! ' :i s ii HI pi obi ems and 1 earned +-hc ^
 r» leal Let i souices 
through his formal education, <'T. . ^8:^ i r- r.»en the testimony 
relative to Dt Cook's practical experiei 
the trial i-uiu i liml n reasonable basi P tc .jLOiude that i 
was qualified to render expert testimony, and therefore, .Judge 
Bunnell did not abuse his (jiscretion in refus i uc :j t i > o r d e r a new 
trial. 
31 
D. The Jury Was within its Province to Discount the Expert 
Opinion Rendered by Defendants' Experts and to Accept that of Dr. 
Cook. 
Dr. Gibb claims that the other experts who testified at 
trial were more qualified and their testimony more believable than 
that of Dr. Cook. The record demonstrates that Dr. Gibb's counsel 
cross-examined Dr. Cook regarding his qualifications and the bases 
for his opinion. (T. 1387-1391). During that cross-examination, 
Dr. Gibb's counsel elicited all of the information which he 
believed to be pertinent to discredit Dr. Cook's testimony. 
It can hardly be gainsaid that it is solely within the 
jury's province to determine the credibility of expert testimony. 
In Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
[T] he weight to be given [expert] testimony is 
a matter for the jury. No matter how arcane 
the subject matter or how erudite the witness, 
the jury is not required to accept the 
expert's testimony as conclusive. The jurors 
may give such testimony any weight they 
choose, including no weight at all. 
Instruction No. 8 (Appendix B), reiterated this very principle: 
You should consider such expert opinion and 
the reasons, if any, given for it. You are 
not bound by such an opinion. Give it the 
weight you think it deserves. If you should 
decide that the opinions of an expert witness 
are not based upon sufficient education and 
expertise, or if you should conclude that the 
reasons given in support of the opinions are 
not sound, or that such opinions are 
outweighed by other evidence, you may dis-
regard the opinion entirely. 
Instruction 21 (Appendix C) , underscored the jury's prerogative to 
weigh conflicting expert testimony: 
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In resolving any conflict that may exist in 
the testimony of medical experts, you may 
compare and weigh the opinion of one expert 
against that of another. In doing this, you 
may consider the relative qualifications and 
credibility of the expert witnesses, as well 
as the reasons for each opinion and the facts 
and other matters on which such opinions are 
based. 
Although Dr, Glbb may disagree, it was within the sole prerogative 
of the jury to make their own determination as to Dr. Cook's 
credibi 1 it y „ "Tin"1 la-Mi t hut the •)u?y may have chosen to beli e ve Dr. 
Cook in no way provided a proper basis for the trial court to order 
a new trial. 
DR. GIBB WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO CONTEST DR. 
COOK'S TESTIMONY. 
-*>• Dr. Gibb's Failure to Object to Dr. Cook's Testimony Alone 
Furnishes the Basis for This Court to Uphold the Trial Court's 
Decision Not to Order a New Trial. 
Mrs. Brady obviously did not include Dr. Cook's name in 
answer to discovery requests noi. on the witness list since 1 le w as 
not consulted until I. lie .last clay of trial, On the day Mrs. Brady 
called Dr. Cook, her. counsel notified defendants' counsel during 
the noon and afternoon break that he intended t_u i al I I'M <\H\\ I u 
testi f;y concerning the deficits in Mrs, Brady' s peripheral vision. 
At that time, Dr Gibb's counsel questioned the regularity of 
calling an undisclosed witness. Mrs. Brady's ecu inse] responded 
tl laL tie intended to proceed and defendants' counsel could make his 
objections if he desired. (Transcript of Post-Trial Motions, 31-
33; 76-78). 
Despite this discussion, Dr. Gibb made no objection when 
Dr. Cook was called. In support of his motion for new trial and on 
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this appeal, Dr. Gibb claims that Dr. Cook's testimony was a 
surprise and therefore prejudicial. However, the record is clear 
that even though he had successfully excluded some of Dr. 
Fraunfelder's testimony on the basis of surprise earlier in the 
trial (T. 565-582), Dr. Gibb did not move to exclude Dr. Cook's 
testimony nor did he object on the basis of surprise. This 
situation is nearly identical to the circumstances addressed by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Chournos v. D'Acrnillo, 642 P. 2d 710, 713 
(Utah 1982), wherein the Court upheld the trial court's refusal to 
order a new trial, stating: 
Failure to interpose a timely objection to 
testimony challenged on the ground of surprise 
would itself be a sufficient reason to deny a 
motion for a new trial on that ground. 
While Judge Bunnell did not specify Dr. Gibb's failure to object as 
a basis for denying the motion for new trial, this Court can take 
cognizance of Dr. Gibb's failure and uphold the trial court's 
denial of a new trial on this basis alone. See, Weber v. 
Snvderville West, 800 P.2d 316, 320 (Utah App. 1990) ("We may 
affirm the trial court on any proper ground") . See also Taylor v. 
Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah App. 1989) and Bagshaw v. 
Bacrshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah App. 1990). 
B. Dr. Gibb Has No Recourse to the "Plain Error" Doctrine to 
Support Reversal of the Trial Court's Denial of His Motion for a 
New Trial. 
Dr. Gibb alleges that it was "plain error" for the trial 
court to allow Dr. Cook to testify despite Dr. Gibb's own failure 
to raise any objection or move to strike the testimony. Surely, 
Dr. Gibb cannot expect the trial judge to act as an advocate for 
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him and to sua sponte protect Dr. Gibb's interests. While the law 
recognizes that in the interests of justice, an appellate court 
will review a trial court's actions despite a party's failure to 
object, that doctrine is obviously narrowly construed. 
Normally, the party claiming "plain error" is seeking 
review of a jury instruction to which the party has failed to 
object under Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, 
before a reviewing court will apply the plain error doctrine, "it 
is incumbent upon the aggrieved party to present a persuasive 
reason to invoke the discretion of [the reviewing] court." E.A. 
Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v. W.C. Fry & Sons, Inc., 665 
P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1983). Where the party "has not met its 
burden of showing special circumstances warranting such a review," 
the appellate court will decline review. Cambelt International 
Corp. v. Dal ton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Utah 1987) . Dr. Gibb has not 
even attempted to explain why he failed to object to Dr. Cook's 
testimony or to have the testimony stricken during trial. Lacking 
a cogent reason for this failure, Dr. Gibb has no grounds to seek 
this Court's review on the basis of plain error. 
C. Admission of Exhibits 64 and 65 Does Not Provide a Basis to 
Reverse the Judgment. 
Dr. Gibb contends that the judgment should be reversed 
as a result of the trial court's admission of Exhibits 64 and 65 --
the written results of Dr. Cook's visual field testing. This issue 
is not reviewable by this Court, and the alleged error was not 
prejudicial in any event. 
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1. Question of reviewability. 
Dr. Gibb has taken this appeal from the trial court's 
denial of Dr. Gibb's motion for a new trial. It is therefore 
axiomatic that this Court would review those matters upon which the 
trial court based its rulings. Significantly, although Dr. Gibb's 
counsel did object to the admission of these exhibits at trial, he 
did not raise the admissibility of Exhibits 64 and 65 as a basis 
for the motion for new trial. Accordingly, since Judge Bunnell did 
not consider the admissibility of Exhibits 64 and 65 as a basis for 
granting a new trial, this Court should not consider the issue on 
appeal. 
2. No prejudice. 
Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that, "Error 
may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected." The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that in order for a reviewing court to 
find that an error has affected the substantial rights of a party, 
the appellate court must consider the impact of the alleged error 
in the context of the whole proceeding. Kelson v. Salt Lake 
County, 784 P.2d 1152, 1157 (Utah 1989) . As a corollary, the 
Supreme Court has held that the wrongful admission of a particular 
piece of evidence is not prejudicial where the erroneously admitted 
evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence entered at trial. 
See Wheeler v. Jones, 431 P.2d 985 (Utah 1967) and Dowlend v. Lvman 
Products for Shooters, 642 P.2d 380 (Utah 1982) . Here, the 
exhibits were nothing more than written confirmation of the oral 
36 
testimony of Dr. Cook, to which Dr. Gibb took no exception. 
Additionally, the exhibits supported Mrs. Brady's oral testimony 
regarding the limitations of her peripheral vision to which Dr. 
Gibb again had made no objection. Since the exhibits were merely 
cumulative evidence of other testimony already admitted, error in 
their admission, if any, was non-prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
Dr. Gibb cannot prevail on this appeal, because he has 
not demonstrated an error which prejudiced him. Since the expert 
testimony respecting the standard of care was essentially undisput-
ed, there is no reasonable basis to conclude that the jury 
disregarded this evidence in favor of another standard. Moreover, 
the trial court's only error in instructing the jury was its 
refusal to give Mrs. Brady's res ipsa loquitur instruction. 
Correction of that error would favor Mrs. Brady not Dr. Gibb. 
Finally, the trial court had reasonable bases to admit Dr. Cook's 
testimony, and Dr. Cook waived his right to claim error in any 
event. In view of the foregoing, Mrs. Brady respectfully submits 
that this Court should affirm the trial court in all respects and 
award Mrs. Brady her costs on this appeal. 
DATED this /3 day of January, 1994. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
L. Rich Humphews 
M. Douglas Bayfl 
Attorney for Appellee 
Marjorie Brady 
37 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE were mailed first class mail, postage prepaid, this /3 
day of January, 1994, to the following: 
Gary Stott 
Curtis J. Drake 
Nathan R. Hyde 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant 
Dr. Randal B. Gibb 
Key Bank Tower 
50 South Main Street, 7th Floor 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465 
38 
Tab A 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
There is a doctrine in the law which creates an inference of 
negligence on the part of a healthcare provider if each of three 
elements is established by a preponderance of the evidence: 
1. That the patient's injury was of a kind which, in the 
ordinary course of events, would not have happened had due care 
been observed; and 
2. That the patient's actions were not responsible for the 
injury; and 
3. That the item causing the injury was under the exclusive 
management or control of the healthcare providers. 
If you find that each of the above three elements apply to 
defendants Dr. Randall B. Gibb, Dr. Clisto D. Beaty or Mountain 
View Hospital, then you may conclude that defendant was negligent 
and that such defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries. Each defendant may introduce evidence to 
rebut such inference of negligence. You should weigh all of the 




The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the 
opinions of a witness to be received as evidence. An exception 
to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. Witnesses 
who, by education, study and experience, have become expert in 
some art, science, profession or calling, may state opinions as 
to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as an 
expert, so long as it is material and relevant to the case. You 
should consider such expert opinion and the reasons, if any, 
given for it. You are not bound by such an opinion. Give it the 
weight you think it deserves. If you should decide that the 
opinions of an expert witness are not based upon sufficient 
education and experience, or if you should conclude that the 
reasons given in support of the opinions are not sound, or that 
such opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may disregard 
the opinion entirely. 
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INSTRUCTION 21 
In resolving any conflict that may exist in the 
testimony of medical experts, you may compare and weigh the 
opinion of one expert against that of another. In doing this, 
you may consider the relative qualifications and credibility of 
the expert witnesses, as well as the reasons for each opinion and 
the facts and other matters on which such opinions are based. 
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